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Reexamining the Monetarist Critique of 
Interest Rate Rules
Robert G. King and Mau-Ting Lin
ject to important real shocks, monetarist econo-
mists argued for allowing interest rates to fluctuate
more widely, while seeking to control a monetary
aggregate for stabilization purposes. More specifi-
cally, Brunner (1978), Friedman (1968, 1985), and
particularly Poole (1978) argued that the Federal
Reserve System’s unwillingness to change interest
rates over time exacerbated the business cycle,
leading the central bank to make the money supply
procyclical.1
In recent years, macroeconomic analysis has
increasingly used small, fully articulated quanti-
tative macroeconomic models to study the effects
of alternative monetary policies. In the terminol-
ogy of King and Wolman (1996), these are the
“St. Louis models of the 21st Century,” capable
of exploring alternative policies in a manner
1 INTRODUCTION
O
nce upon a time, the nature of the
short-term nominal interest rate was a
central dispute among macroeconomists.
Keynesian economists stressed that it was the
opportunity cost of holding money. Monetarist
economists stressed that the nominal rate was a
central part of an intertemporal price, with the
real interest rate the equating market for loan
supply and demand.
Such divergent perspectives led these groups
of macroeconomists to subscribe to different poli-
cies for the management of interest rates. Viewing
the demand for money as fluctuating substantially
over time and viewing the short-term nominal
interest rate as principally affected by monetary
factors, Keynesian macroeconomists argued for
holding the interest rate fixed as economic activity
fluctuated or, at least, varying it gradually over
time. Viewing loan supply and demand as sub-
Monetarist economists argued long ago that central bank interest rate rules exacerbate macro
economic fluctuations, essentially by not allowing the interest rate to respond promptly to shifts
in the supply and demand for loans. To support this critique, they pointed to the procyclicality of
the money stock. Yet, when there are real shocks and a real business cycle, modern macroeconomic
models imply that some procyclicality of money is desirable, to stabilize the price level. A simple
interest rate rule illustrates that the monetarist critique can be valid within this model, since the
rule exacerbates the response of real activity to real shocks. Other interest rate rules instead limit
the macro economy’s response to real shocks. But, while these interest rate rules have diverse
effects on real activity, there is an important common implication: By smoothing the nominal
interest rate in the short run, the rules all lead to increases in the longer-run variability in inflation
and nominal interest rates.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, July/August 2005, 87(4), pp. 513-30.
1 For example, in an interview in this Review, Brunner (1978) argues
“apparently uncontrollable money growth… essentially results
from the central bank’s unwillingness, or political inability, to
adjust the interest rate…to the realities of the market place.”
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          consistent with the recommendations of Lucas
(1976).2 Increasingly, these models are studied
with a focus on interest rate rules for monetary
policy, particularly variants of the rule put forward
by Taylor (1993). In this article, we return to the
concerns of Brunner, Friedman, and Poole, study-
ing the effect of some alternative interest rate rules
within a modern quantitative macroeconomic
model. We are specifically interested in whether
monetarist concerns about the exacerbation of
the business cycle carry through to modern model
economies under alternative interest rate rules
related to Taylor’s specification. Therefore, in our
analysis, we consider three interest rate rules and
we explore how each affects the dynamic response
of the macroeconomy to two real shocks: shifts
in government purchases and productivity. First,
we consider an “inflation only” variant of the
Taylor rule, in which there is no output gap
response. Second, we consider the original Taylor
specification. Third, we consider a more dynam-
ically complicated interest rate rule estimated by
Orphanides and Wieland (1998), which includes
a lagged nominal interest rate term.
To consider how these rules alter the behavior
of economic activity, we exploit the fact that there
is a “neutral” solution for real activity—the solu-
tion that would obtain under flexible prices—that
can be brought about by the monetary authority
if it fully stabilizes the price level. The neutral
real activity solution can be brought about by an
interest rate rule that “tracks the natural rate of
interest.” We use the neutral outcomes as a bench-
mark for subsequent analysis. The analysis of
neutral outcomes also highlights the fact that the
procyclicality of money does not, on its own,
rationalize the concerns of Brunner, Friedman,
and Poole. Since the neutral output solution
requires that the price level be stabilized, while
real activity fluctuates, money must move posi-
tively with real activity. In this regard, our model
accords with Friedman’s (1969, p. 46) observation
that a stable price level requires a specific trend
growth rate of money when there is growth in
productivity and labor, but we apply this reason-
ing to output responses over the course of a real
business cycle.
Using the “inflation only” interest rate rule, we
find that this policy exacerbates economic fluc-
tuations for the reasons suggested by Brunner,
Friedman, and Poole. Since nominal and real
rates should rise immediately in response to both
disturbances in the neutral solution, but cannot
according to the policy rule, there must be an
additional stimulative increase in money. Thus,
there is a temporary increase in output relative to
the neutral paths relevant for each disturbance.
The key to these exacerbation results is that the
“inflation only” interest rate rule does not accom-
modate shifts in the neutral real interest rate.
The other interest rate rules that we consider,
the specifications of Taylor (1993) and Orphanides
and Wieland (1998), also do not accommodate
shifts in the neutral real rate, as shocks to govern-
ment purchases or productivity take place. How-
ever, because there are responses to an output gap
measure in these rules, their implications are more
complicated. We find that these rules restrict—
rather than exacerbate—cyclical variations in
output that arise from real shocks. In effect, when
there is a rise in real economic activity from our
demand shock (government purchases) or supply
shock (productivity), these rules call for a smaller
degree of monetary accommodation than would
occur under neutral policy. Hence, increases in
government purchases and productivity both
bring about declines in the price level for several
quarters, which are associated with temporary
declines in output relative to the neutral level.
Strikingly, given the empirical analysis of Galí
(1999), both our Taylor and Orphanides-Wieland
specifications imply that there is a small absolute
decline in output when there is a positive produc-
tivity shock, which translates into an important
decline in labor input.3
While the interest rate rules that we study have
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2 Kimball (1995) calls similar models “neomonetarist.” Goodfriend
and King (1997) describe them as the result of a “new neoclassical
syntheses.”
3 Working within a modern macroeconomic model, but with stag-
gered price setting at a 4-quarter horizon, Dotsey (2002) finds that
the Taylor rule does not involve a decline in labor input. Although
there are a number of other differences between the models, one
is tempted to conclude that the discrepancy between his results
and ours suggests that the effect of interest rate rules depends
importantly on the details of the price-setting structure.diverse consequences for real activity, there is an
important common implication: By smoothing
the nominal interest rate in the short-run, the rules
all lead to a substantial increase in the variability
of nominal interest rates. That is, the interest rate
rules all lead to low-frequency variation in infla-
tion, which is essentially neutral and thus fully
reflected in the nominal rate. Such increased
volatility in inflation and nominal interest rates is
another standard monetarist concern about inter-
est rate rules (Friedman, 1968, and Poole, 1978).
The organization of the paper is as follows.
Section 2 describes the macroeconomic model
that we employ in this paper. Section 3 discusses
the response of the macroeconomy to real govern-
ment purchase and real productivity shocks, under
the assumption of “neutral policy,” which stabi-
lizes the path of the price level and produces
outcomes that are equivalent to a real business
cycle model. Section 4 considers how the dynamic
responses differ under our three interest rate rules.
Section 5 is a summary and conclusion.
2 A ST. LOUIS MODEL
The small quantitative macroeconomic model
that we use is closely related to those in King and
Watson (1996), King and Wolman (1996), and Yun
(1996).4
2.1 Households
There are many identical households in the
economy. Each values a composite consumption
good, c, and leisure, l, as summarized by the
expected utility objective 
(1) .
The household can invest in various financial
instruments, including government bonds at
price 1/(1 + Rt), and in a diversified portfolio of
claims to firms at price vt. It also makes invest-









ments, it, in real capital, which it rents to firms
in the economy at rental rate, qt. Its receives
wage rate wt for units of work nt and receives
lump-sum transfers or taxes from the government
in amount Tt. Thus, its one-period budget con-
straint takes the form 
(2)    
In this expression, bt and et are the quantities of
bonds and equities held at the start of period t.
The household faces three other constraints. First,
capital evolves according to
(3)                  
In this expression, the rate of depreciation is δ
and φ is an increasing, concave function (h(0) = 0),
which allows for capital stock adjustment costs
as in Hayashi (1982). Second, the household has
a time constraint,
(4) .
Third, the household must hold an asset—fiat
money—in sufficient quantity to pay for its con-
sumption and investment expenditures, as well
as tax payments to the government that are neces-
sary to finance its real expenditures:
(5) .
We do not model the demand for money explic-
itly, simply assuming that the quantity equation
holds.5 In this regard, we depart from King and
Wolman (1996), who introduced a shopping time
technology to motivate money demand holding
and derived detailed information on “transactions
wedges” in an otherwise similar model. In the
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4 The calibration and computation follow directly from King and
Wolman (1996), with all parameters matching that study with one
exception, which is that we assume a smaller extent of investment
adjustment costs. The economy is linearized around a zero inflation
steady state and solved as a linear rational expectations model.
Replication materials for the analysis are available at 
http://people.bu/edu/rking/Research.htm.
5 One way to think about this assumption is that it involves interest
payments on the monetary aggregate, which is relevant for trans-
actions purposes, but with a small spread so that the demand for
money is determinate. Under this interpretation, it is appropriate
to ignore revenue from money creation in the household budget
constraint.widely used in analysis of sticky price models, to
stress that our results on policies are not depend-
ent on a particular transactions technology and
the implied money demand structure.
Given the problem just noted, we can cast
the decision problem of households in dynamic
programming form and derive efficiency condi-
tions that restrict its optimal choices. First, indi-
viduals choose consumption and work efficiently:
(6)                         
(7)                         .
In these expressions, λt is a Lagrange multiplier on
(2) and wt is a real wage rate. Second, individuals
choose holdings of nominal and real bonds accord-
ing to Fisherian principles,
(8)                  
(9) ,
where rt is a shadow real interest rate—which is
determined so that the supply and demand for real
bonds is zero—and Rt is the market-determined
nominal interest rate.
2.2 Microgoods
Consumption, investment, and government
aggregates are produced, using a standard Dixit-
Stiglitz (1977) specification, from a continuum of
goods on the unit interval. For example, the con-
sumption aggregate is 
Cost minimization implies that the demand for
the ith good takes the form 
where Pt(i) is its nominal price and Pt is the price
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We assume that the same aggregator governs
investment and government purchases, so that the
demand for the ith product then takes the form 
,
where ct + it + gt = dt is aggregate demand.
2.3 Firms
As in many macroeconomic analyses with
the “New Keynesian” elements surveyed in
Rotemberg (1987), we assume that firms are
monopolistic competitors facing exogenous oppor-
tunities for price adjustment in the Calvo (1983)
manner. Each firm rents labor and capital from
households, combining these factors to produce
its output according to a constant returns-to-scale
production function of the Cobb-Douglas form.
Looking at firm i, its output is 
(10)                ,
where at is an aggregate productivity shifter, which
is constant across firms. Given this specification,
the firm’s real marginal cost of producing output,
ψt, is independent of its output level and equal to 
(11)                  
The absence of the firm index, i, reflects the fact
that all firms have the same marginal cost, which
varies with wage and rental rates. Firms set nomi-
nal prices, acting as monopolistic competitors and
recognizing that they may be unable to adjust
prices in future periods (with probability η). They
have a forward-looking pricing rule of the form
(12)
.
That is, the firm sets price as a markup over dis-
counted measures of costs and demand, as dis-
cussed previously by King and Wolman (1996),
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Since there is a continuum of firms on the unit
interval (so that the law of large numbers applies)
and since the probability of being unable to adjust
in a given period is η, the stationary distribution
of firms by age of price is ωj = (1 – η)ηj for j= 0,1,2...
Accordingly, as stressed by Yun, there is an aggre-
gate production function that depends on linear
aggregates of inputs used by firms with various
vintages of prices, yt = atf(kt,nt),
with and 
that can be used for purposes such as extraction
of a Solow residual. At the same time, the price
level pertinent for the demand analysis previously
noted takes a nonlinear form:
(13)   .
National income identities require that 
(14)                      ,
with 
(15)                      
being a measure of relative price distortions.
Because we will assume that the economy is
operating at a low (zero) inflation rate, variations
in δt are locally unimportant.
2.5 Neutral Policy Rule
We close this model with an interest rate
policy rule. Our benchmark is a “neutral” policy
rule that involves strict inflation management.
This interest rate rule takes the form 
(16)               .
In this expression, r*
t is the level of the real interest
rate—sometimes called the “natural rate” of
interest—that would arise if output were contin-
uously at its flexible price level. With a large value
of f, this rule may alternatively be approximated
by 
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Under this policy rule, then, actual and
expected inflation are always zero. As stressed
by King and Wolman (1996) and Goodfriend and
King (1997), the economy operates at its “natural
rate” level, i.e., delivers the same time series of
output and other real variables as would arise if
prices were completely flexible.
2.6 Taylor Rules
The next two rules are based on the work of
John Taylor (1993), with greater than one-for-one
increases in the nominal interest rate when infla-
tion exceeds a specified benchmark level (treated
here as zero for expositional ease). We write Taylor
rules as 
.
That is, the nominal interest rate is adjusted in
response to an average of recent inflation and in
response to a measure of the output gap. Rather
than specifying an economic model of the output
gap, we let it be deviation of output from an
average of past values, 
.
We do not require that the lags in these expres-
sions be the same; indeed, our Taylor rule cases
involve responses to annual average inflation
(T1 = 4) and deviations of output from a 6-year
moving average (T2 = 24). We use this simple
specification because we think it is a simple
description of how standard capacity output
measures behave over time.
It is important to stress that our formulation
of this rule, like Taylor’s original specification,
does not involve the central bank “tracking the
natural rate of interest.” (That is, it is r* not r*
t
that enters into the policy rule.) In this regard, it
is potentially quite different from the neutral
policy rule stated previously.
2.6.1 An “Inflation Only” Variant of the
Taylor Rule. As a reference point, we begin with
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reacts only to inflation and responds only to
annual average inflation over the preceding year: 
(17)                 .
In this setting, we use Taylor’s 1.5 value for the
coefficient τ1. This coefficient value implies that
there is a unique stationary rational expectations
equilibrium.
2.6.2 A Standard Taylor Rule. Our version
of the standard Taylor rule is
(18)
.
That is, in this case, we use both of Taylor’s val-
ues, setting τ1 = 1.5 and τ2 = 0.5. The output gap
measure is based on deviations from the 6-year
(24-quarter) moving average, i.e., 
These values also imply that there is a unique
stationary rational expectations equilibrium.
2.7 An Estimated Rule
There has been much recent work on estimat-
ing interest rate rules for monetary policy. We
employ a particular specification due to
Orphanides and Wieland (1998), which takes the
form 
(19)  
where we again take the output gap as a deviation
from a 6-year moving average. In our model, these
values also imply that there is a unique stationary
rational expectations equilibrium.
3 NEUTRAL BENCHMARKS
Our starting point is the responses that obtain
in the “core real business cycle model” within our
sticky price model. There are two interpretations
Rr R r tt t j
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of these responses, which we use interchangeably,
with one important exception discussed in detail
hereafter.
The first interpretation is that prices are com-
pletely flexible, so that we are essentially looking
at the workings of a real business cycle (RBC)
model. This set of outcomes is not efficient,
because there is monopoly power, but represents
one definition of the natural rate of output (see
Goodfriend and King, 1997, and Woodford, 2003). 
The second interpretation is that monetary
policy is conducted, as in section 2.5.1, to fully
smooth the price level. Under this policy, real
outcomes are those of the RBC solution, but nomi-
nal money must also be determined so that real
balances satisfy the quantity equation at the speci-
fied price level. That is, activist monetary policy
is required to smooth the price level in the pres-
ence of real shocks.
Hence, the two interpretations differ only on
the path of money: It is not incorporated in the
RBC solution (and could be anything), and it takes
on particular values in the pegged price level case.
Accordingly, our figures report the path of the
money stock under the latter interpretation.
3.1 Response to Government
Purchases
We consider a unit increase in government
purchases under the assumption that the station-
ary share of government purchases is 20 percent
(g/y = 0.2). We assume that this increase is persist-
ent, but ultimately temporary, with government
purchases being governed by gt = ρgt–1 + egt with 
ρ = 0.9. The increase in government purchases is
usefully thought of in two ways. First, it is a
“demand shift,” increasing the level of aggregate
demand at a given real interest rate. Second, it is
a “resource shift,” amounting to a decrease in the
output available for consumption and investment,
without altering the level of the production func-
tion or its marginal products.6
The dynamic response to this shock is shown
in Figure 1. The shock is a 5 percent movement
in government purchases, which translates into
King and Lin
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6 That is, in the terminology of Baxter and King (1993), we are con-
sidering the case of basic government purchases.a 1 percent variation in resources available to the
private sector because g/y = 0.2 in the stationary
state. The government purchase shock requires
about a 0.5 percent increase in the money stock,
because the neutral private response is to increase
output by about 0.5 percent. The price level
response is, of course, zero under this policy.
In terms of dynamic responses of model vari-
ables, we focus on four variables that will play
a role in subsequent discussion. First, output
increases because individuals choose to respond
in part by working harder and in part by decreas-
ing consumption. Second, the markup charged
by firms does not change, simply staying at 
µ = ε/(ε – 1). Third, the real interest rate rises to
stimulate work and to discourage consumption
and investment. Fourth, given the absence of
expected inflation, the response of the nominal
rate is identical to the response of the real rate.
The rate increase is quite small, about 20 basis
points, despite the presence of substantial invest-
ment adjustment costs. This small response
reflects the willingness of individuals to substitute
consumption and work across time in response
to changed intertemporal incentives.
3.2 Response to Productivity
We consider the effects of a permanent 1 per-
cent increase in total factor productivity, as dis-
played in Figure 2. As we have structured it, this
permanent productivity shock has the implication
King and Lin
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% Deviation % Deviation
Basis Points
Figure 1
Effects of a Rise in Government Purchases Equal to 1 Percent of GDP Under Strict Price Level
Constancythat there is no long-run labor response and there
is thus a 1/α = 1.72 percent effect on the level of
output.7
The dynamic responses involve a jump in
output, followed by a gradual increase toward
the new higher steady-state level. The presence
of quantitatively important investment adjustment
costs means that the equilibrium response of labor
to productivity shocks is fairly small. Under flexi-
ble prices/strict price level constancy, the average
markup does not change in response to this shock,
as it also earlier remained constant in the face of
government purchase shocks. Variations in the
real interest rate in response to this productivity
shock are quite small, even in the presence of
investment adjustment costs: A large increase in
productivity produces only a relatively minor
increase in the real interest rate.
4 RESPONSE UNDER INTEREST
RATE RULES
We now consider the dynamic implications
of the three standard interest rate rules, studying
the response of the macroeconomy to government
purchase and productivity shocks in each case.
All results are compared with the benchmark
results from Figures 1 and 2, which are the results
7 This zero long-run labor response requires that the permanent
productivity shock leaves the g/y ratio unchanged in the long run.
To accomplish this, we assume that the government continuously
maintains a constant g/y ratio in the face of this shock.
King and Lin
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Basis Points
Figure 2
Effects of a 1 Percent Rise in Total Factor Productivity Under Strict Price Level Targetingthat would obtain under strict price level targeting
or, equivalently, under flexible prices.
4.1 An Example
As background to analysis of all of the rules,
it is useful to consider the following simple equa-
tion system. Suppose that the nominal interest
rate is given by a Fisher equation, 
,
as will indeed be the case in our model. Suppose
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This policy rule involves no response to devia-
tions of the real rate from its long-run value and
no real output term. However, the nominal rate
does respond to an exponentially weighted aver-
age of inflation.
These equations can be solved to yield 
Etπ –
t+1 – (1 – ξ)π –
t – τξπ –
t–1 = –ξ(rt – r*). With τ > 1,
0 < ξ < 1 and τ < ((2 – ξ)/ξ), there is a unique 
stable rational expectations solution, 
where θ1 > 1 and –1 < θ2 < 0. Hence, the “average”
inflation rate that enters in the policy rule is posi-
tively related to a present value of interest rates
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Figure 3
Effects of a Rise in Government Purchases Equal to 1 Percent of GDP Under an Interest Rate
Rule that Responds Only to InflationNext, assume that the real interest rate is
exogenous and is governed by a first-order stochas-
tic difference equation, [rt – r*] = ρ[rt – r*] + et.
Then, it follows that average inflation obeys
and thus that the nominal interest rate evolves
according to
Hence, the nominal interest rate inherits the per-
sistence of the real interest rate, but this is some-
what mitigated due to the presence of the lagged


















interest rate term that derives from the central
bank’s concern about average inflation. The solu-
tion to this difference equation implies that 
Accordingly, shocks to the real interest rate
exert an amplified influence on the future nominal
interest rate under two conditions. First, it must
be the case that ρ > (1 – ξ), which is the restric-
tion that the real rate process involves more per-
sistence than the inflation averaging process.
Second, it must be the case that one is looking
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Basis Points
Figure 4
Effects of a 1 Percent Rise in Total Factor Productivity Under an Interest Rate Rule that
Responds Only to Inflationsufficiently far ahead that the effects of θ2 are
negligible. Under these two conditions, the real
rate then affects the nominal rate with a greater
than one-for-one effect because 
8
This example highlights the fact that interest
rate policies can ultimately produce a positive
τξ






comovement of the real interest rate and expected
inflation. That is, one legacy of stabilizing the
nominal interest rate in the short run against shifts
in the real interest rate is to produce longer-run
variations in inflation. Of course, the Fisher equa-
tion and the interest rate rules are only part of
modern macroeconomic models and it is not the
case that the real interest rate is exogenous. How-
ever, the mechanisms of this simple model provide
insight into aspects of the general equilibrium
dynamics discussed hereafter.
4.2 The “Inflation Only” Rule
We start by considering the implications of
an interest rate rule (17), which depends only on
recent inflation.
King and Lin
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% Deviation % Deviation
Basis Points
Figure 5
Effects of a Rise in Government Purchases Equal to 1 Percent of GDP Under the Standard 
Taylor Rule
8 As an example, suppose that τ = 1.5 as in Taylor’s analysis and that
ξ is set equal to 0.4 as a rough approximation to 4-quarter averaging
(the same mean lag). Finally, suppose that the real rate is quite
persistent, with ρ = 0.9 These parameters imply that θ2 = –0.54.
After 6 quarters (since 0.546 = 0.02, the economy would be left a
nominal rate that was about τξ/[τξ – ρ(ρ – (1 – ξ))] = 1.82 times as
high as the real rate.4.2.1 Government Purchases. Figure 3 shows
the effects of a rise in government purchases. In
line with the suggestions of Brunner, Friedman,
and Poole, the dynamic responses in this case
involve an exacerbation of the benchmark
responses for real output (the neutral responses
are the dashed lines in this and subsequent fig-
ures). Given that the nominal interest rate is pre-
determined and the neutral responses (introduced
in Figure 1 and repeated as the dashed lines in
Figure 3) involve a rise in the real interest rate,
there is a tension: There must be either a depar-
ture of the real interest rate from its neutral level
or a decline in expected inflation. This tension
is resolved by a transitory increase in output
beyond the benchmark level, which gives indi-
viduals an incentive to save and reduces the
upward pressure on the real interest rate. As
part of the process, the money stock expands
more rapidly than in the neutral case, as sug-
gested by Brunner, Friedman, and Poole.
To fit the dynamics together, here and below,
we have found it useful to adopt the monetarist
perspective, taking the path of the money stock
as exogenous and using this path to explain the
variations that arise in other variables, including
the nominal interest rate (which is governed by
the policy rule). To start on this approach, note
that Figure 3 implies that the path for money
exceeds the neutral policy path. Further, money
rises more in the short run than it does in the long
run. Given this increase in money, either real
income (y) or the price level (P) must increase
(or both). With output temporarily high relative
to the neutral path, the real interest rate will be
lower than the neutral path. But, given that there
is expected inflation and the nominal interest rate
is predetermined, the real interest rate must
actually fall on impact.
After a few quarters or so, real activity is
largely on the neutral path. Hence, after this point
in the impulse responses, the simple model intro-
duced here previously can be used: The central
bank’s focus on inflation leads to higher nominal
interest rates, which rise more than one-for-one
with the real interest rate.
4.2.2 Productivity. Figure 4 shows the
dynamic effects of a rise in total factor produc-
tivity if the central bank adjusts the interest rate
solely in response to recent inflation experience,
in line with (17). In this case, the money stock
increases relative to the neutral level and then
continues to grow for many periods. Similar to
the government purchase response, there is a
temporary stimulation, although it is smaller and
of less-protracted duration. As a consequence,
there is a temporary decline in the real interest
rate relative to the neutral solution. As was the
case with government purchases, output is on
the neutral path after about four quarters, so that
the simple model can be used to explain the
comovement of nominal and real interest rates.
4.2.3 Relationship to Monetarist Critique(s).
The two examples studied here show that there
can be an “exacerbation” of short-run output
responses under an interest rate rule.9 However,
the exacerbation of real responses is small rela-
tive to the overall effect of the disturbances on
economic activity.
After the initial interval of monetary non-
9 Quantitatively, the effects are not too large in the current setting,
which incorporates no recent mechanisms to increase the amplitude
and persistence of monetary shocks.
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Decomposition of Nominal Interest Rate
Variations in Response to a Government
Purchase Shock Under the Taylor Ruleneutrality, there is the comovement of the real
rate, the inflation rate, and the nominal interest
rate highlighted by the simple model considered
in section 4.1. In line with that example, a conse-
quence of the interest rate rule is that the short-run
“leaning against” fluctuations in the nominal rate
of interest leads to greater medium-term volatility
in inflation and the nominal rate, which is related
to concerns expressed by Friedman (1968) and
Poole (1978).
4.3 The Standard Taylor Rule
With a Taylor response to the approximate
output gap, (τ2 = 0.5), a very different pattern of
response to government purchase and produc-
tivity shocks is displayed in Figures 5 and 7. As
indicated by the money supply responses in the
first panel of each figure, the central bank does
not exacerbate economic fluctuations in the
short run under such a Taylor-style interest rate
rule. Instead, the interest rate rule works to
restrain variations in output, relative to the neu-
tral solution. (Again, this neutral solution is the
dashed line in each figure.)
4.3.1 Government Purchases. An increase
in government purchases increases output and
the real interest rate under the neutral solution,
but requires a supporting increase in the money
stock. Because there is a reduction in the quantity
of money relative to the neutral solution, there is
a decline in aggregate demand and output (again
King and Lin
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Figure 7
Effects of a 1 Percent Rise in Total Factor Productivity Under the Standard Taylor Interest Rate
Rulerelative to the neutral solution). The decline in
demand also induces a subset of firms to adjust
prices downward, with a resulting decrease in the
price level and an increase in the real markups
of the average firm. Because output is temporarily
reduced—relative to the neutral benchmark—
and because there is a modest expected deflation,
the real interest rate rises on impact while the
nominal rate is fixed.
There are interesting dynamic elements of
the behavior of nominal interest rates under the
Taylor rule, displayed in Figure 6. There are two
features of importance. First, given the rise in
output that takes place due to the increase in
government purchases, the Taylor rule coefficient
of τy = 0.5 implies that there is an initial rise in
the nominal interest rate path. Second, after the
initial year or so, high inflation is an inheritance
of a shock to government purchases, as in our
example noted previously.
4.3.2 Productivity. A permanent increase in
productivity raises output permanently and the
real interest rate temporarily under the neutral
solution, but again requires a supporting increase
in the money stock. The Taylor rule dramatically
alters the effects of this shock relative to the
neutral solution: It leads to a sharp rise in the
real interest rate as output adjusts only gradually
toward its new higher level. In our context, then,
the Taylor rule is consistent with the effects of
productivity shocks that Galí (1999) displays in
a sticky price model with an exogenous money
stock.
By looking at the path of the quantity of money,
the short-run parts of the dynamic responses are
again relatively easy to understand. When the
productivity shock takes place, the quantity of
money immediately declines. This leads to a
decline in the level of output even though pro-
ductivity has risen, a decline in the price level,
and a sharp rise in the average markup charged
by firms. Since output is temporarily low relative
to the neutral path (and relative to the long-run
level), there is a substantial increase in the real
interest rate. The Taylor rule is consistent with
these changes because the nominal interest rate
is held fixed, while expected deflation occurs.
The dynamic response to inflation and real
activity built into the Taylor rule also means that
there are longer-lasting effects of the productivity
shock on the path of inflation and the nominal
interest rate. The productivity shock gives rise to
a sustained period of deflation, during which the
nominal interest rate is low. Figure 8 shows that
the dominant quantitative effect on interest rate
policy is from inflation, but that there is also a
contribution from output being high relative to
the central bank’s response to a slowly evolving
measure of the output gap.
4.3.3 Relationship to Monetarist Critique(s).
These responses to government purchase and
productivity shocks under the Taylor rule illus-
trate that interest rate rules can “stabilize” rather
than “exacerbate” responses to real shocks.
However, the stabilization is likely undesirable,
because there is a presumption in these models
that the natural rate solution is approximately
optimal (see Goodfriend and King, 1997, and
Woodford, 2003).
These two examples also show that govern-
ment purchase and productivity shocks, which
both raise the real interest rate, can exert different
effects on inflation. Government purchases first
King and Lin
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Decomposition of Nominal Interest Rate
Variations in Response to a Productivity
Shock Under the Taylor Ruledecrease and then increase the inflation rate;
productivity movements decrease it under the
Taylor rule. Because these variations are largely
anticipated after a year or so, they are manifest
in high or low nominal interest rates during the
latter portions of the dynamic responses.
4.4 An Estimated Rule
There has been much recent interest in esti-
mating interest rate rules for the United States
and other countries. Typically, these studies turn
up support for one or more interest rate lags and
one or more output gap lags. The estimated rule
of Orphanides and Wieland (1998) is representa-
tive in this regard. Figures 9 and 10 provide an
indication of the effects of such an estimated rule
within our model.
In terms of government purchases, the
responses in Figure 9 look much like “a smoother
Taylor model,” with the main features preserved
from that simpler specification.10 The Orphanides-
Wieland rule leads output to respond less to
government purchases in the short run than it
would under the neutral specification. When
there are increases in demand, the Orphanides-
Wieland rule also leads to a short period of
declining prices followed by inflation.
10 One exception is that the nominal interest rate is not predetermined
under the Orphanides-Wieland rule because the central bank
responds contemporaneously to output.
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Figure 9
Effects of a Rise in Government Purchases Equal to 1 Percent of GDP Under the Orphanides-
Wieland RuleIn terms of productivity shocks, the responses
in Figure 10 also inherit the main features of the
Taylor rule, although yielding a smoother and
more-protracted pattern of responses. The
Orphanides-Wieland interest rate rule retards
the expansion of output from the productivity
shock, inducing a rise in the markup and the real
interest rate in the early stages of the expansion.
A decline in the money stock and the price level
accompany the productivity expansion.
5 CONCLUSIONS
We view the analysis in this article as our
first step in reassessing the continuing relevance
of the monetarist critique of interest rate rules to
two important topics. First, we are interested in
whether these concerns are important for under-
standing aspects of the macroeconomic history
of the United States and other countries. That is,
did the use of specific interest rate rules for mone-
tary policy exacerbate or stabilize the business
cycle fluctuations that would have arisen from
real shocks? Second, we are interested in whether
these concerns are important to the design of good
operating rules for monetary policy. That is, how
large are the departures of specific interest rate
rules from optimal policies?
Our analysis highlights the role that real
factors can play in both of these investigations.
With sticky prices, interest rate rules can produce
real outcomes that diverge from the real business
cycle responses that would be delivered by neutral
King and Lin
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Figure 10
Effects of a 1 Percent Rise in Productivity Under the Orphanides-Wieland Rulepolicy, with the policy rules either exacerbating
or stabilizing the real cycle. As suggested by
monetarist economists—like Brunner, Friedman,
and Poole—variations in the money stock are one
set of indicators of these departures. However, our
modern model specifies that the relevant mone-
tary indicator is the gap between the money supply
response under a specific interest rate rule and
that which would occur under a neutral policy
that effectively accommodated real shocks. In
addition, our modern model suggests that interest
rate rules increase the lower-frequency variability
of inflation.
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